Virtues and reasons are two of the most fruitful and important concepts in contemporary moral philosophy. Many writers have commented upon the close connection between virtues and reasons but no one has done full justice to the complexity of this connection. It is generally recognized that the virtues not only depend upon reasons but also sometimes provide them. The essays in this volume shed light on precisely how virtues and reasons are related to each other and what can be learned by exploring this relationship. 　 Virtue s Reasons is divided into three sections each of them devoted to a general issue regarding the relationship between virtues and reasons. The first section analyzes how the virtues may be related to or linked with normative reasons in ways that improve our understanding of what constitutes virtuous character and ethical agency. The second section explores the reasons moral agents have for cultivating the virtues and how the virtues impact moral responsiveness or development. The final section examines how reasons can be employed in understanding the nature of virtue and how specific virtues like modesty and practical wisdom interact with reasons. This book will be of major interest to scholars working on virtue theory the nature of moral character and normative ethics.